Computer Misuse (Amendment) Act 2013 in operation from 13 March 2013

22 March 2013

The Computer Misuse (Amendment) Act 2013 (Commencement) Notification 2013 was published on 13 March 2013 to notify that the Computer Misuse (Amendment) Act 2013 has come into operation on 13 March 2013.

The Act seeks to amend the Computer Misuse Act (Cap. 50A) to enable the Government to take more effective and timely measures to prevent, detect and counter cyber attacks that may threaten national security, essential services, defence or the foreign relations of Singapore. It does this by expanding the scope of the existing section 15A.

The Act also makes consequential amendments to other written laws, including the Goods and Services Tax Act and the Income Tax Act, by including the words “and Cybersecurity” after the words “Computer Misuse” in the definitions of “computer” and “computer output”.

Source: e-Gazette

Economic Expansion Incentives (Relief from Income Tax) (Amendment) Act 2013 passed

25 February 2013

The Economic Expansion Incentives (Relief from Income Tax) (Amendment) Act 2013, first published on 20 February 2013, was passed in Parliament on 14 January 2013 and assented to by the President on 13 February 2013.

It implements the tax changes relating to the integrated investment allowance announced in the Government’s 2012 Budget Statement and makes certain other amendments to the Economic Expansion Incentives (Relief from Income Tax) Act (Chapter 86 of the 2005 Revised Edition) as well as related and consequential amendments to the Income Tax Act (Chapter 134 of the 2008 Revised Edition).

Details of the amendments to the various sections of the Economic Expansion Incentives (Relief from Income Tax) Act and the Income Tax Act can be found in the “Explanatory Statement” of the Economic Expansion Incentives (Relief from Income Tax) (Amendment No. 2) Bill.

Source: Government Gazette

Income Tax (Approved Banks) Order 2013 deemed to have come into operation on 30 November 2012 (S 90/2013)

21 February 2013

The Income Tax (Approved Banks) Order 2013 was published on 19 February 2013 and is deemed to have come into operation on 30 November 2012.

In this Order, Bank of Montreal Singapore Branch is approved as an ‘‘approved bank’’ for the purposes of section 13(1)(t) of the Income Tax Act.

Source: Government Gazette

High Court – AQQ v Comptroller of Income Tax – [2012] SGHC 249

3 February 2013

Income Tax – Anti-avoidance provisions in s 33

The Appellant, a Singapore company, was incorporated as part of B group’s restructuring exercise in 2003, where the Appellant is wholly owned by B, a Malaysian public company. The group’s structure before and after the restructuring exercise are illustrated in Diagrams A and B respectively.

Diagram A: Pre- restructure

Diagram A

where B and C are Malaysian companies and D, F, G and H are Singapore companies

Diagram B: Post- restructure

Diagram B

The Appellant acquired the Singapore subsidiaries (D, F, G and H) after obtaining the funds by issuing convertible notes (“Notes”) to N Bank Singapore, which then sold it on to N Bank Mauritius. N Bank Mauritius in turn sold it on to C. All of the parties involved paid the same principal amount for the Notes (ie $225m), which flowed in a circle from the Appellant through N Bank Singapore and N Bank Mauritius to C. All these happened on the same day. C obtained the $225m required to buy the Notes by getting loans amounting to $150m from B and D, the very companies from which the Appellant bought its shares in the Subsidiaries and combining these loans with the $75m it received from the Appellant for its original interest in the Subsidiaries. The $225m essentially flowed in a circle from N Bank Singapore to the Appellant to the related parties (ie D, B and C) to N Bank Mauritius and then back to N Bank Singapore.

During the relevant years of assessment, the Appellant received dividends, being income chargeable to tax, from the acquired subsidiaries,. These dividends carried tax credits arising from tax deemed deducted at source which could be set off against tax payable on the Appellant’s chargeable income. At the same time, the Appellant duly paid the interest due under the Notes to the bank. These interest payments constituted interest expenses which were deductible from the dividend income.

The Appellant, in its tax returns for the relevant years of assessment, claimed the deduction of the interest expenses from the dividend income as well as the benefit of the tax credits under the full imputation system for the taxation of dividends through the s44 account mechanism. This resulted in substantial tax refunds to the Appellant.

The Comptroller of Income Tax (“the Comptroller”), initially accepted the Appellant’s tax computation, but subsequently formed the view that the Appellant had engaged in a tax avoidance arrangement and purported to exercise his powers under s 33(1) of the Income Tax Act to disregard both the dividend income and the interest expenses by issuing notices of additional assessments to recoup the earlier tax refunds. The Comptroller was not satisfied that there was commercial justification for the Financing Arrangement and stated that the arrangement was for the main purpose of deriving a tax advantage.

The appeal to the Income Tax Board of Review against the Comptroller’s decision was dismissed on the grounds that the link between the loan and the dividend income was artificial and the Appellant was incorporated pursuant to an artificial and contrived financing arrangement in order to obtain the benefit of the s 44 credits; and that that the interest payments were artificial because the interest paid by the Appellant to N Bank Singapore was in substance returned to the B group in the form of conditional payments. As such, the Comptroller had the power and authority under s 74 of the Act to assess the Appellant to additional tax.

The Appellant appealed to the High Court.

The central questions in the appeal were whether the arrangement by which the Appellant incurred interest expenses which it set off against dividends from its subsidiaries constituted tax avoidance within the ambit of s 33; and whether the Comptroller was entitled to exercise his powers under s 33(1) in the manner that he did.

The following issues were considered:
i. Whether the Board adopted the right approach towards s 33;
ii. Whether the Financing Arrangement fell within any of the three limbs of s 33(1);
iii. Whether the Appellant could avail itself of the statutory exception under s 33(3)(b);
iv. Whether the Appellant could avail itself of the relevant specific provisions of the Act (ie ss 14(1)(a), 44, 44A and 46) and override the operation of s 33;
v. Whether the Comptroller was right to disregard both the dividend income and interest expenses under s 33;
vi. Whether the Comptroller had the power to issue the Additional Assessments.

The appeal was allowed. In summary, the High Court held that the Comptroller was right in applying the anti-avoidance provisions in s 33 only in so far as the Financing Arrangement was concerned, but not when it came to the restructuring arrangement. The Comptroller was therefore right to disregard the interest expenses, but he should not have disregarded the dividend income.

The key points in arriving at the decision were as follows:

i. Whether the Board adopted the right approach towards s 33

The Income Tax Board of Review had focused on the point that the Financing Arrangement was artificial and contrived and lacked commercial justification and therefore s 33(3)(b) applied.

Judge, however, agreed with the Appellant that the correct approach was to first determine whether the arrangement fell within one or more of the three limbs of s 33(1) as only if so would the statutory exception in s 33(3)(b) be triggered. The Board hence adopted the wrong approach by erroneously conflating s 33(1) and 33(3)(b).

It must be noted that even if the Board’s approach was incorrect, it may be that the Board’s ultimate conclusion that s 33 was properly invoked is correct. Thus, to succeed in its appeal, the Appellant must also show that even if the right approach was adopted, s 33 would not apply.

ii. Whether the Financing Arrangement fell within any of the three limbs of s 33(1)

The Financing Arrangement fell within s 33(1)(c), where the purpose or effect of the arrangement in question was “to reduce or avoid any liability imposed or which would otherwise have been imposed on any person by this Act”. The following supports this conclusion:

• Without the interest expenses, the whole dividend income would be subject to tax. By generating interest expenses which are claimed as deductions against dividend income, the Financing Arrangement had the purpose or effect of reducing the total tax chargeable on the dividend income.

• In addition, the Financing Arrangement also had the effect of avoiding the liability of C to bear withholding tax under s 45 for the interest payments that it received. By interposing N Bank Singapore and N Bank Mauritius, the Financing Arrangement had the effect of enabling C to receive the full interest payments without being liable to pay withholding tax at all.

iii. Whether the Appellant could avail itself of the statutory exception under s 33(3)(b)

To avail itself of the statutory exception under s 33(3)(b), the Appellant must show that the Financing Arrangement was “carried out for bona fide commercial reasons and had not as one of its main purposes the avoidance or reduction of tax”. This it failed to prove.

In fact, the chief financial officer/director of B admitted that the main objective of the Financing Arrangement was indeed to extract the tax credits in the Subsidiaries’ s 44 accounts.

In addition, the Appellant acquired the Subsidiaries at a cost greatly exceeding the approximate value of the Subsidiaries. The larger the amount paid for the Subsidiaries, the more the borrowing, and the more the interest to be paid, resulting in more allowable deductions thereby reducing the tax on the dividend income. Ultimately, that would lead to more tax refunds from the Comptroller. There was also no satisfactory evidence that the interest rate was commercially arrived at.

The loan and corresponding interest flowed in a circle such that, in substance, there was no real loan made by N Bank to the Appellant. N Bank Singapore and N Bank Mauritius were interposed in the Financing Arrangement so that the Appellant would be able to obtain the tax refunds without the interest it bore being taxed in the hands of C.

The Financing Arrangement was, therefore, not carried out for bona fide commercial reasons and had, as one of its main purposes, the avoidance or reduction of tax.

iv. Whether the Appellant could avail itself of the relevant specific provisions of the Act and override the operation of s 33

This point is unnecessary as Singapore already has a statutory exception under s 33(3)(b) to protect taxpayers from the over-extensive application of anti-avoidance provisions. Ultimately, the question is whether a proper balance is struck between the rights and interests of taxpayers and the Comptroller in interpreting and applying s 33. A proper balance is struck by interpreting s 33(1) as importing an objective test, while allowing taxpayers to avail themselves of the statutory exception under s 33(3)(b) which should be interpreted as importing a purely subjective test

v. Whether the Comptroller was right to disregard both the dividend income and interest expenses under s 33

As it was the Financing Arrangement alone that offended s 33, the Comptroller should not have disregarded the dividend income. His power under s 33(1) is to disregard or vary only the impugned arrangement.

In addition, the Comptroller should not have disregarded all the interest expenses. Instead, he should have disregarded only the interest expenses borne by the Appellant attributable to the $150m lent by D and B to C (ie, two-thirds of the total interest expenses incurred by the Appellant). The Comptroller should have allowed the interest expenses arising from the $75m loan made by C to be deductible expenses in assessing the Appellant to tax (ie, one-third of the total interest expenses incurred by the Appellant). At the same time, the Comptroller should have required the Appellant to account to it for the withholding tax that ought to have been paid by C on interest payments borne by the Appellant arising from the $75m loan.

Based on the above, the Comptroller did not exercise his powers under s 33(1) fairly and reasonably when he disregarded both the dividend income and the interest expenses. For this reason, the tax assessed ought to be discharged.

vi. Whether the Comptroller had the power to issue the Additional Assessments

The Appellant’s submission that the Comptroller acted ultra vires when he issued the Additional Assessments under s 74(1) was accepted. This is because in each of the assessments, the Comptroller assessed the Appellant to less tax than that under the Original Assessments.

The above judgement was delivered on 18 December 2012.

Court of Appeal – AQP v Comptroller of Income Tax – [2013] SGCA 3

3 February 2013

Income Tax – deduction

The Appellant’s ex-Managing Director (“Ex-MD”) misappropriated company funds and was dismissed in Dec 1999. The Appellant made a provision for doubtful debt for the loss arising from the misappropriation for the year ended 31 December 1999, but did not claim a tax deduction in that Year of Assessment. A judgement was obtained against the Ex-MD in 2003 but the latter was subsequently declared a bankrupt rendering the loss irrecoverable. In December 2005, the Appellant applied to the Comptroller of Income Tax for relief under s 93A of the Income Tax Act on the basis that it had made an “error or mistake” within the meaning of that section by not claiming a deduction for the Loss under s 14(1) of the Act in its Year of Assessment 2000 income tax return. The application was denied.

The Comptroller’s decision that the Loss did not qualify for a deduction under s 14(1) was upheld by the Income Tax Board of Review as well as the High Court. In arriving at this decision, both the Board and the High Court looked at the “overriding power and control” test, which asks whether the defalcator possessed an “overriding power or control” in the company (ie in a position to do exactly what he likes) and whether the defalcation was committed in the exercise of such “power or control”. If so, the losses which result from such defalcations are not deductible for income tax purposes.

The Appellant then appealed to the Court of Appeal with the sole issue being whether the High Court judge had erred in holding that the loss did not qualify for deduction under s 14(1) of the Act.

A plain reading of s14 (1) would suggest that employee defalcations would not usually be considered as an “outgoing” or “expense” which is “wholly and exclusively incurred…in the production of income”.

Case law, however, indicates a different approach when addressing employee defalcations, and courts (across jurisdictions) have, in fact, allowed deductions in so far as defalcations by employees who do not have overriding power or control in their respective organisations are concerned (eg a cashier taking funds from an employer’s till). This is based on the fact that such defalcations are an inevitable fact of commercial life in general and the conducting of the business concerned in particular. Put simply, the granting of such deductions is premised on commercial reality.

The situation is radically different where defalcations are effected by employees who have overriding power or control in their respective organisations. Checks and balances can, and ought to, be in place to prevent such overriding power or control from being abused by the employee concerned, hence resulting in the defalcations perpetrated by that employee.

If a sufficient system of checks and balances has been put in place by the taxpayer and defalcations nevertheless occur as a result of an employee still managing to abuse his or her position of overriding power and control, the court would generally permit a deduction for such defalcations under s 14. Conversely, if the taxpayer does not put in place a sufficient set of checks and balances with the result that overriding power or control is abused by the employee concerned, then it is logical, fair as well as commonsensical, for the taxpayer to be refused a deduction for such defalcations under s 14.

The onus of demonstrating to the relevant tax authorities that the employee concerned was not placed in a position of overriding power or control or that, if he or she had been so placed, that a sufficient system of checks and balances had indeed been instituted, notwithstanding the fact defalcations had still been effected by the employee concerned, lies on the taxpayer concerned.

The High Court had, when disallowing the deduction, relied on the criminal proceedings against the Ex-MD to conclude that the Ex-MD was in a position of overriding power and control. The Appellant, however, was not a party to the criminal proceedings and therefore did not have the opportunity, inter alia, to proffer evidence as to whether or not it had, in fact, instituted a proper system of checks and balances. It had also not been given the opportunity to challenge the findings of the court in the criminal proceedings that the Ex-MD did possess overriding power or control in the first place.

The Court of Appeal therefore held that it would be just and fair for the proceedings to be remitted to the Board in order for the necessary evidence to be adduced with regard to whether the Ex-MD was in a position of overriding power or control for the purposes of the present (civil) proceedings and, if so, whether a sufficient system of checks and balances had been put in place by the Appellant on the facts of this particular case. The Board should then proceed to render a decision in accordance with the “overriding power or control” test.

The above judgement was delivered on 16 January 2013.